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Reliability and Safety Modeling of a Digital 
Feed‐Water Control System 
 
 
Abstract: Much digital instrumentation and control systems embedded in the critical medical healthcare equipment, 
aerospace devices, and nuclear industry have obvious consequence of different failure modes. These failures can 
affect the behavior of the overall safety-critical digital system and its ability to deliver its dependability attributes if 
any defected area that could be a hardware component or software code embedded inside the digital system is not 
detected and repaired appropriately. The safety and reliability analysis of safety-critical systems can be accomplished 
with Markov modeling techniques which could express the dynamic and regenerative behavior of the digital control 
system. Certain states in the system represent system failure, while others represent fault free behavior or correct 
operation in the presence of faults. This paper presents the development of a safety and reliability modeling of a digital 
feedwater control system using Markov-based chain models. All the Markov states and the transitions between these 
states were assumed and calculated from the control logic for the digital control system. Finally, based on the 
simulation results of modeling the digital feedwater control system, the system does meet its reliability requirement 
with the probability of being in fully operational states is 0.99 over a 6 months’ time. 
 
Keywords--- instrumentation and control; safety-critical; dependability; embedded; safety; reliability; feedwater; 
probability. 
 
 
I. Introduction    
      Digital control systems are a critical facet to the reliability and safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) operation. 
The control systems are continuously reading plant information and sending commands to actuating units [1]. The 
dependability analysis of these systems is used to increase the performance, resilience, and output capacity of the 
safety critical system, in particular redundant structures have been used to design robust engineering systems [1][2]. 
Computer-based dependable embedded systems have been designed to recognize and tolerate their own faults; i.e. 
fault-tolerant computer systems. For instance, Reconfiguration, the process of removing faulty components and either 
replacing them with spares or degrading to an alternate configuration. Although the capability of tolerating certain 
faults, these systems are still susceptible to different failure modes. Thus, the reliability of these systems must be 
evaluated to ensure that design requirements are met. Traditionally, the reliability analysis of a complex digital system 
consisting of many components has been accomplished using combinatorial mathematics. The standard "fault tree" 
method of reliability analysis is based on such mathematics. Fault tree tries to reduce the number of behavior to be 
considered in order to get the safe design. It analyzes the system in top-down approach trying to find the possible path 
of undesirable state [3]. Unfortunately, the fault-tree approach is incapable of analyzing systems where reconfiguration 
is possible. In reconfigurable systems the critical factor often becomes the effectiveness of the dynamic 
reconfiguration process. Dynamic fault free (DFT) however, is used to utilize the Architectural Analysis and Design 
Language (AADL) to model Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) [4]. It is necessary to model such systems 
using the more powerful Markov modeling technique [5]. However, one of the disadvantages of Markov model is the 
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number of attributes (states) that represent system characteristics such as the number of working processors. The more 
attributes included in the model design the more complex the system will be. 
       Modeling a system with Markov model require representing each state of the system with their attributes, which 
considered system characteristics. Where, the smallest set of attributes included in the model the less complex the 
system will be and can describe the fault behavior. The engineering for system focus design and development efforts 
on the functional behavior required under normal operating conditions and given environmental assumptions such that 
consideration of failure scenarios could postponed until the design is completed. Thus, Safety analysis should be 
conducted to identify possible ways to improve the reliability and safety in the DFWCS system [6]. The next step in 
the modeling process is to characterize the transition time from one state to another. The system architecture used 
degradable triplex system. Which means transition from one state to another represents a failure with a non-constant 
rate. The reliability of the system is often faced many of such trade-off cases where real time critical systems should 
be conservative direction and represent system failure properly.  
      In this paper, the conservative approach will be used exclusively. All transitions in the reliability model are 
deducible from its architecture. This measurability is the main consideration in developing a model for a digital system. 
The transitions of a fault-tolerant system are divided into two categories: slow failure transitions and fast recovery 
transitions. If the states of the model are defined properly, then the slow failure transitions can be obtained from field 
data. The primary problem is to model the system so that the determination of these transitions is as easy as possible. 
If the model has many detailed states, the number of transitions that must be measured can be exorbitant. The paper 
will enlighten the expectations results of designing reliability and safety model of a digital feedwater control system. 
We used the computer program SURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator) [7][8] to solve reliability model 
numerically with Markov Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) used to control 
the input water level in its associated steam generator.  
 
II. Overview of the Digital Feedwater Control System 
       Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) is used to control the input water level in its associated steam 
generator [9] from approximately 1% reactor output power up to 100% reactor output power. DFWCS is basically 
divided into four divisions: sensors module, fault-tolerant group1 module, fault-tolerant group2 module, and actuators 
module. Fault tolerance techniques based on redundancy management are typically used to detect the fault occurrence 
in digital systems. The redundancy can either be in time, or in hardware, which is called passive redundancy and used 
to identify the permanent faults occurring in combinational logic circuits [10].  
     The DFWCS contains a redundancy management scheme to organize the behavior of the system and avoid going 
to unsafe failure mode. For example, a duplication Main and Backup digital processing unit that works as a pair-of-
comparing module, which can read various inputs through digital sensors interfaced to processors via wired connection 
and write control outputs to the actuating unit, is used as a fault-tolerant group1. Each one of these two processing 
units use at least two types of independent error detection techniques such as watch dog timers and self-testing unit 
which both are assumed to be non-perfect. The monitored inputs (sensors readings of the Plant) include reactor power 
level, steam and water flow, water temperature, and water level. The digital processor outputs number of sets of the 
operating positions of two valves: Main Flow Valve (MFV) and Bypass Flow Valve (BFV), and the Feedwater Pump 
(FWP) as shown in the overview figure Fig.1 and in the architectural design figure Fig. 2. The Main and Backup 
digital processors operate as a redundant pair, each of which reads the inputs and deliver the outputs. In case the Main 
processor fails, the Backup processor can take over the operation of the system. The outputs of both the Main and 
Backup processors are passed to a set of four Proportion, Integral, and Derivative (PID) Controllers. Three of these 
controllers assigned to the Main Flow Valve (MFV), Bypass Flow Valve (BFV), and Feed-Water Pump (FWP) 
respectively, while the fourth controller acting as a spare PID controller for either the MFV or BFV PID controllers, 
as shown in Fig. 2. If both main and backup processors fail, the PID controllers can operate in a manual mode.  Loss 
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of any PID controller with both processors failed is system loss.  Loss of PID that is detectable leading to fail-safe 
shutdown and the loss of PID undetectable leading to fail-unsafe must be considered in the design and analysis.   
 
Fig.1. Overview of the Digital Feed-Water Control System 
 
      The PID associated with each of the controlled devices performs a “reasonableness” check of the desired setting 
from the Main processor and delivers the final output to the controlled device. In the event that the main processor 
fails, and it is detected, the backup processor takes over. The DFWCS operates in one of two primary modes: (1) Low 
Power Control Mode, or (2) High Power Control Mode. The first mode is used when the reactor power is less than 
approximately 15% and, in this mode, the MFV is normally closed, and the BFV is manipulated to control the water 
level in the associated steam generator. The second mode is used when the reactor power is between approximately 
15% to 100% and in this mode the BFV is normally closed, and the MFV is manipulated to control the water level in 
the associated steam generator.  
 
Fig.2. System Architectural Design 
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       In order to increase the fault tolerance of the system, several Override Modes exist which under certain conditions 
allow the MFV or BFV to be used if the normally controlled valve has failed. For example, in Low Power Control 
Override Mode, the BFV can be bypassed and the MFV can be manipulated to control the water level. Given that tha 
basic parameters for the Markov model:  𝜆 = Failure transitions. C= Error detection and reconfiguration coverage. S 
= State. Also, other parameters can be listed as: 
fwp = Feed water pump failure rate  
FWP_pid  = PID feed water pump failure rate  
sensor_steam = Steam sensor failure rate  
sensor_WF  = Water flow sensor failure rate  
sensor_temp = Temperature sensor failure rate 
sensor_level = Water level Sensor failure rate  
sensor_RX = RX power sensor failure rate  
controller_main = Main controller failure = controller_backup = Backup controller failure rate  
MFV_pid = PID_main flow valve failure rate  
BFV_pid = PID_backup flow valve failure rate 
SPARE_pid = Spare PID_valve failure rate  
MFV = main flow valve failure rate  
BFV =- Backup valve failure rate  
Ccontroller = Error detection mechanism coverage of the Main and backup processor, CPID = Error detection mechanism 
coverage of the PIDs (MFV and BFV) 
 = repair or reconfiguration rate of the main controller. (72 hours for permanent faults) (10 minutes for transient 
faults), sensor_Total = Sum of all the sensors failure rates =  sensor_steam +sensor_WF + sensor_temp + sensor_leve + sensor_RX 
 
    The table below shows different requirements of the altered safety integrity levels (SIL) in dependence to the 
probability of failure. The determination of probability of failure is extensively explained in [11]. 
DFWCS Component Name Failure Rate Parameter (per hour) 
Power Level Sensor 
PS  
6101 −  
Steam Flow Sensor 
SF  
6101 −  
Water Flow Sensor 
WF  
6105.1 −  
Water Temp Sensor 
WT  
6101 −  
Water Level Sensor 
WL  
6101 −  
Main processor 
MC  
6103.3 −  
Backup processor 
BU  
6103.3 −  
Main Flow Valve PID 
PIDFLOWMAIN __  
6101 −  
Bypass Flow Valve PID 
PIDBYPASS _  
6101 −  
Spare PID 
PIDSPARE _  
6101 −  
Main Flow Valve 
MFV  
6102.1 −  
Bypass Flow Valve 
BFV  
6101 −  
Feed-Water Pump PID 
PIDFWP _  
6101 −  
Feed-Water Pump 
FWP  
6101 −  
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III. Design Requirements and Specifications 
       The design requirement of the DFWCS control system is required to be 0.99 reliable over a 6-month time. Also, 
the probability of being in an unsafe state should be less than 10-3. Accordingly, we classify the important states in the 
Markov model as operational, Fail-operational, Fail-safe, and Fail-unsafe. The markov model has been solved by 
using the NASA WinSURE and the NASA WinSTEM software programs. Coverage of 0.90 was assumed for both 
the processor coverage (Cc controller) and the PID coverage (Cp id) initially. The coverage rate was changed 
throughout the process of testing the model to observe the impact of the system reliability and system safety. The 
other specifications are listed as follows:  
a. Determine the transitions between states based on the operational narrative of the digital system.   
b. Assume non-perfect coverage of the error detection mechanisms.  Our approach to model the system 
should be guided by partitioning the model into fail safe states and fail unsafe sates. 
c. The proposed Markov model has used the NASA WinSure program, assume .90 coverage (initially).   
d. Then, we determine the probability of being in a failsafe at the end of 400 hours and 4000 hours, 
and the probability of being in a fail unsafe at the end of 400, 4000 hours. 
The list of the assigned symbols and coefficients used in the Markov Model is shown in table 1:  
 
Table 1: Failure rates for different components for the system modeled using the Markov model shown in Fig. 3. 
λ 1 = λ controller_main = 3.3x10 6. 
λ 2 = λ controller_backup =3.3x10 6 
λ 3 = λ FWP_pid = 1x10 6 
λ 4 = λ MFV_pid = λ BFV_pid = λ SPARE_pid = 1x10 6 
C = C controller = C pid =0.90 
μ permanent = Controller Repair Rate = PID Repair Rate = 1/MTTR = 1/72 hr. = 0.014 repair/hr. 
μ transient = Controller Repair Rate = PID Repair Rate = 1/MTTR = 1/ 10 minutes. = 6 repair/hr. 
 
IV. Approach used and its Implementation 
      To calculate the reliability and the safety of the DFWCS control system, seven states Markov model has been 
constructed. This model includes five operational states, one failed safe state, and one failed unsafe state as it is shown 
in table 2. The Markov model is intended to be illustrative of the typical parameters used in a analytical model [12], 
is shown in Fig. 3. The Markov model of the system is shown in Fig. 3. All the states are either in fully operational 
state, fail operational state, failsafe state, or the fail unsafe state. The states and the cases are illustrated in table 2: 
 
Table 2: State number and status for the Markov modeled system based on fig 3. 
State Number (1-7) State Status 
1 System Fully Operational (all the components are healthy) 
2 Fail Operational (one processor: online or spare processor fails) 
3 Fail Operational (two processors: online and spare processors fail and MFV PID used 
as a manual processor) 
4 System Fully Operational (all the components are healthy) 
5 Fail Operational (one PID: BFV or FWP PID fails) 
6 Fail Safe (two PID fail with detection, two processors and MFV PID fail with 
detection) 
(System doesn’t function and doesn’t cause harm) failure is successfully detected by 
the self-diagnostic test) 
7 Fail Unsafe (death) (two PID fail without detection, two processors and MFV PID fail 
without detection) (System doesn’t function and does cause harm) failure is not 
detected by the self-diagnostic test) 
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      The model contains seven states that represents all cases that we have assumed for the system. State 1 and state 4, 
which both are called fully operational states; represent the case where all the components of the DFWCS control 
system are operating correctly. State 2, which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which either the 
main processor or the spare processor has failed, and that problem has been successfully detected by either the 
watchdog timer or the self-test process that occur inside the MFV PID. State 3, which is called fail operational state, 
represents the system in which both the main processor and the spare processor have failed and detected correctly. In 
this state, the MFV PID has used as a manual processor. State 5, which is called fail operational state, represents the 
system in which, either the BFV PID or the FWP PID, has failed and that problem has been detected and successfully 
corrected. State 6, that is called fail safe state, represents the system safely failure and controlled. A one can reached 
state 6 through the failure of two PIDs with successful detection due to the sequence of two faults, or through the 
failure of two processors and MFV PID because of the three faults sequence. State 7, which is called fail safe state, in 
which the system fails unsafely and cannot being controlled. A one can reached state 7 through the failure of two PIDs 
with successful detection due to the sequence of two faults or through the failure of two processors and MFV PID 
because of the tree faults sequence. 
 
Fig. 3. Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control System 
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Fig. 4. Simulation of Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control System using WinSURE Software 
program 
 
 
     The circles shown in figure Fig. 4, represent the seven different states. The reference numbers (17) are represent 
the transition state for Markov Model in the NASA WinSURE software. The transitions arrows include the failure 
rates for different components, fault coverage values, and repair rates [9]. The transitions illustrated on the state 
diagram of Fig. 3, can be explained as follows: the transition from state 1 to state 2 can occur only if one of the two 
processors is failed (see Fig. 3), that failure is detected either by the watchdog timer or by the self-diagnostic of the 
PID, and this failure is handled correctly. Whenever this failure is not detected, the system will go into state 7, in 
which the system fails unsafely and may cause harm to the operators and the environment. The second transition from 
state 2 into state 3 is occurred only if both the online processor and the spare processor are failed and the MFV PID is 
used as a manual processor to keep the functionality of the system. Also, the system will go into death state (State 7), 
if the failure of these two processors is not detected. After the occurrence of third sequenced fault that affect on the 
MFV PID, the system will either go into state 6 or into sate 7 based on the successful detection of the self-diagnostic 
test. The transition from state 4 into state 5 can be occurred only if one PID either BFV or FWP is failed and detected 
correctly. After that, the system will become vulnerable to the effect of the second fault that takes the system either 
into state 6 or into sate 7, depending on the successful detection of this fault. The system is being repaired in three 
different states that are state 2, state 3, and state 5 and the repair rate in those states during Δt time is μ Δt. 
 
The Markov model equations for the designed system can be written in matrix form, and as following: 
 
 Psystem (t + Δt) = Tsystem * Psystem(t) 
 
Where: Tsystem: The state transition matrix. 
 
Psystem(t): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t. 
 
Psystem ( t + Δt ): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t + Δt. 
 
 
V. Reliability and Safety Modeling Analysis of the DFWCS 
      The mathematical equations of the proposed markov model of the designed system can be written from the state 
diagram shown in Fig. 3. [13]. For example, the probability of the system being in a state 2 at time t + Δ t depends on 
the probability that the system was in a state from which it could transition to state 2 and the probability of being in 
that state. The probability equations of the Markov model and the resulted 2D state transition matrix that includes all 
the failure rates and fault coverages for the system are shown below.  
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The probability that a system will be failed at some time (t + Δt) 
 
P (t + Δt) = 1 -  𝑒−𝜆 𝛥𝑡 = 𝜆 𝛥𝑡 
P1 (t + Δt) = (1 - 𝜆1 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P1 (t) + µ 𝛥𝑡 P2 (t)  
P2 (t + Δt) = (1 – (𝜆2 + µ) 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P2 (t) + 2 µ 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t)  
P3 (t + Δt) = (𝜆2 C 𝛥𝑡) P2 (t) + (1 – (𝜆2 + 2µ) 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P3 (t) 
P4 (t + Δt) = (1 - 2𝜆3 C 𝛥𝑡) P4 (t) + µ 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) 
P5 (t + Δt) = 2 𝜆3 C 𝛥𝑡 P4 (t) + (1 - (2𝜆4 +  µ ) C 𝛥𝑡) P5 (t)  
P6 (t + Δt) = 𝜆2 C 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t) + 2 𝜆4 C 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) + P6 (t) 
P7 (t + Δt) = 𝜆1(1 −  C ) 𝛥𝑡 P1 (t) + 𝜆2 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P2 (t) + 𝜆2 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t) + 2𝜆3 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P4 (t) + 2𝜆4 (1 - 
C) 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) + P7 (t) 
 
The equations of the discrete time Markov model for the digital feed-water control system can be written as:- 
P (t + Δt) = T-system P-system (t) ➔ P (𝛥𝑡) = T-system P-system (0) 
 
   The reliability of the system: R (t) = 1- P7 (t) = P6 (t) + P5 (t) + P4 (t) + P3 (t) + P2 (t) + P1 (t) 
Where:- 
 
P1 (t + Δt)− P1 (t)
𝛥𝑡
=  𝜆1 𝐶 P1(t) + µ P2 (t) 
P2 (t + Δt)− P2 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
= - (𝜆2 +  µ ) C P2 (t) + 2 µ P3 (t) 
P3 (t + Δt)− P3 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
=  𝜆2 C P2 (t) - (𝜆2 +  2µ ) C P3 (t) 
P4 (t + Δt)− P4 (t)
𝛥𝑡
=  -2𝜆3 C P4 (t) + µ P5 (t) 
P5 (t + Δt)− P5 (t)
𝛥𝑡
= 2 𝜆3 C P4 (t) + -( 2𝜆4 + µ) C P5 (t) 
P6 (t + Δt)− P6 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
=   𝜆2 C  P3 (t) +  2𝜆4 C  P5 (t) 
P7 (t +  Δt) −  P7 (t)
𝛥𝑡
 
=   𝜆1 (1 − 𝐶)P1 (t) +  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)P2 (t) +  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)P3 (t) +  2𝜆3 (1 − 𝐶)P4 (t)  
+  2𝜆4 (1 − 𝐶)P5 (t)  
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P-system (t + Δt) = 
|
|
|
P1 (t +  Δt) 
P2 (t +  Δt) 
P3 (t +  Δt) 
 
P4 (t +  Δt) 
P5 (t +  Δt) 
 
 
P6 (t +  Δt) 
P7 (t +  Δt) 
|
|
|
 
 
The two-dimensional state transition matrix of a Markov model for the system is 
P-system (t + Δt) = 
|
|
𝜆1𝐶  µ 0 0 0 0  0
0 − (𝜆2 +  µ ) C 0 0 0 0 0
0 𝜆2𝐶 − (𝜆2 +  2µ ) C 0 0 0 0
  
      0            0 0 − 2𝜆3C µ 0 0
      0            0 0 2𝜆3C − (2𝜆4 +  µ ) C 0 0
      0           0 𝜆2C 0 2𝜆4C 0 0
 
𝜆1 (1 − 𝐶) 𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶) 2𝜆3 (1 − 𝐶) 2𝜆4 (1 − 𝐶) 0 0
|
|
 
 
P-system (t) = 
|
|
|
P0 (t) 
P1 (t) 
P2 (t) 
 
P3 (t) 
P4 (t) 
P5 (t) 
 
PFS (t) 
PFU (t) 
|
|
|
 
 
VI. Results and Discussions 
     Digital systems have multiple failure modes that depend on the detail (state space) that is embedded in modeling a 
system [14][15]. For the designed DFWCS control system will be completely operational as long as the system is in 
one of five states: state 1, state 2, state 3, state 4, and state 5 (see Fig. 3). As a result, the reliability of the system 
described by the seven states Markov model can be written as follows: - Reliability R (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + P3 (t) + 
P4 (t) + P5 (t). However, the DFWCS control system will be safe if it is in one of six states: state 1, state 2, state 3, 
state 4, state 5, and state 6. The safety of the system described by the seven states Markov model can be written: Safety 
S (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + P3 (t) + P4 (t) + P5 (t) + P6 (t). Reliability R (t) of a system is a function of time and is defined 
as the conditional probability that the system will perform its functions correctly throughout the interval [t0, t], given 
that the system was performing correctly at time t0. Safety S (t) of a system is defined as the probability that the 
system will either perform its functions correctly or will discontinue the functions in a manner that causes no harm. 
       When the “Plot” option was selected using the NASA WinSURE software program, the system unreliability is 
plotted over time. The plot shown in Fig. 5, shows that the probability of being in a death (unsafe) state after 400 hours 
is 0.00002 and the probability of being in a death (safe) state after 4000 hours is 0.00016. This means that the reliability 
is 0.9998 as it is highlighted in table 3 (fault coverage is 0.999). The requirements of the assignment required that the 
state remain 0.99 reliable for 6 months. Therefore, the system does meet reliability requirements.  
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Table 3: Reliability and Safety as a function of fault coverage for the system modeled using the Markov model fig 3 
Fault Coverage 
result from self-
diagnostic test (C) 
Reliability R (t) 
After 6 months 
Safety S (t) Probability of being in  
Fail-safe 
Pfs (t) 
Probability of being in  
Fail-unsafe  
Pfu (t) (death) 
0.900 0.98832 0.98833371 0.00001371 0.01311 
0.920 0.98949 0.98958664 0.00009664 0.01050 
0.940 0.99201 0.99202565 0.00001565 0.00788 
0.950 0.99330 0.99331616 0.00001616 0.006578 
0.960 0.99473 0.994746692 0.000016692 0.005266 
0.980 0.99734 0.997357772 0.000017772 0.002636 
0.990 0.99866 0.998678329 0.000018329 0.001319 
0.999 0.999849 0.99986784 0.00001884 0.000131 
1 0.999981 0.999999898 0.000018898 0000000 
 
      
    The Probability of being in each operational state and in a death state for the digital feed-water control system is 
shown in Fig. 6 using WinSURE Software program. The Probability of being in each operational state and in a death 
state for a digital feed-water control system is shown in Fig. 7 using WinSTEM Software program.  
 
  
Fig. 5.  Probability of being in an unsafe state for a Digital Feed-Water Control System 
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Fig. 6. Probability of being in operational and death states for a Digital Feed-Water Control System using 
WinSURE Software program 
                    
Fig. 7. Probability of being in operational and death states for a Digital-Feed-Water Control System using 
WinSTEM Software program 
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VII. Conclusion 
     In this paper, a conservative Markov modeling analysis for a digital feed-water control system (DFWCS) was 
presented. The computer program NASA WinSURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator) has been used to 
solve reliability model numerically with Markov Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System 
(DFWCS) used to control the input water level in its associated steam generator. The simulation results of modeling 
the digital control system proves that the proposed model has achieved the reliability and safety design requirements 
for the system with the probability of being in fully operational states is 0.99 over a 6 months’ time. 
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